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Abstract
How does language affect cognition?  Is it important that most of our concepts come with 
linguistic labels, such as car or number?  The statistical distributions of how such labels co-occur
in language offers a rich medium of associative information that can support conceptual 
processing in a number of ways.  In this article, I argue that the role of language in conceptual 
processing goes far beyond mere support, and that language is as fundamental and intrinsic a part
of conceptual processing as sensorimotor-affective simulations.  In particular, because linguistic 
association tends to be computationally cheaper than simulation (i.e., faster, less effortful, but 
still information-rich), it enables an heuristic mechanism that can provide adequate conceptual 
representation without the need to develop a detailed simulation.  I review the evidence for this 
key mechanism – the linguistic shortcut – and propose that it allows labels to sometimes carry 
the burden of conceptual processing by acting in place of simulated referent meanings, according
to context, available resources, and processing goals. 
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What Have Labels Ever Done For Us?  The Linguistic Shortcut in Conceptual Processing
All right, but apart from the sanitation, the medicine, education, wine, public 
order, irrigation, roads, a fresh water system, and public health, what have the Romans 
ever done for us?  (Life of Brian: Goldstone & Jones, 1979)
A concept in long-term memory is an aggregate of experience that receives frequent 
attention and can be re-activated relatively easily in offline processing as an instantiated 
representation of the concept1 (e.g., Connell & Lynott, 2014b).  We mentally represent things that
are present in the environment during online processing of real-world perception and action, and 
can represent them again in their absence during offline remembering, planning, and day-
dreaming (Wilson, 2002).  As such, it seems reasonable that attaching a linguistic label to a 
particular aspect of experience could make it easier to perform some conceptual tasks, such as 
acquiring concepts like object kinds (Xu, 2002) and numbers (Carey, 2004), shaping the 
boundaries between colour categories (Winawer et al., 2007), or influencing how easily a visual 
feature or object is detected (Lupyan & Ward, 2013).  Attaching a label to a bundle of experience
may allow us to attend to it more easily in online processing, re-activate it more easily in offline 
processing, and hence help it cohere into a concept by assisting with abstraction (i.e., moving 
from a specific instance of sensorimotor experience to a generalised, aggregate form). However, 
the possibilities regarding language’s role in cognition are more far-reaching than assisting 
concept learning or online perception.  Rather than being peripheral to the “real” concept at hand
and playing a supporting role in cognition, language could instead be an integral part of the 
human conceptual system (Connell & Lynott, 2014b).  
That is, the labels we attach to frequently-attended bundles of experience could comprise 
1 This distinction between long-term concepts and instantiated representations follows the type-token distinction.
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an indispensable part of concepts, play an active role in virtually all aspects of conceptual 
processing, and ultimately enable a more efficient form of cognition than would be possible 
without language.  In the present article, I concentrate on an especially valuable form of 
information from linguistic labels, that of statistical, distributional associations, and review the 
evidence for its role in conceptual processing.  In particular, I hypothesise how one key 
mechanism – the linguistic shortcut – allows labels to carry the burden of conceptual processing 
under a range of circumstances by effectively acting in place of deeper, more detailed 
representations of referent meaning.  When it comes to cognition, labels do rather a lot for us.
Concepts as Simulated and Linguistic Information
Many researchers from across the cognitive sciences have come to an interdisciplinary 
consensus that the human conceptual system comprises two different types of information: 
simulated and linguistic (Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008; Connell & Lynott, 2014b;
Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008; Vigliocco, Meteyard, Andrews, & Kousta, 2009).  Simulated 
information (also known as grounded or embodied representations) emerges from our interactive 
experience with the world around us, and represents conceptual knowledge as a simulation (i.e., 
partial replay) in the same neural systems that are active in processing real–world perception and
action (Allport, 1985; Barsalou, 1999; Connell & Lynott, 2014b; Glenberg & Gallese, 2012; Yee,
Chrysikou, Hoffman, & Thompson-Schill, 2013).  Although often described as “sensorimotor” 
for reasons of history and convenience, such representations are not confined to simple sensory 
and motor information and are also assumed to incorporate affective information (e.g., valence, 
arousal, and emotional states: Niedenthal, 2007) and information about the broader situational 
context (e.g., environmental, social, and intentional factors: Barsalou, 2003; Niedenthal, 
Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005).  A simulated representation of a car, for 
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upholstery (tactile), turning the steering wheel (hand/arm action), enjoyment of the driving 
experience (affective), and streets and other cars outside (situational). 
Evidence for simulations includes neuroimaging and patient studies that have found 
shared activation between areas involved in modality–specific perceptual or action experience 
and their equivalents in conceptual processing.  For instance, reading a sound-related word like 
“thunder” activates the auditory association cortex, and aphasic patients with atrophy of the 
auditory association cortex have impaired processing of such words (Bonner & Grossman, 2012; 
see also Boulenger et al., 2008; Goldberg, Perfetti, & Schneider, 2006; Hauk, Johnsrude, & 
PulvermLller, 2004).  Across a range of paradigms, behavioural experimentation has also 
revealed complex interactions between the representations required for processing the 
environment and those simulated for conceptual processing (e.g., Connell & Lynott, 2010, 2012, 
2014a; Dils & Boroditsky, 2010; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006).  For example, people are faster to 
make size judgements about manipulable objects when they are holding a ball between the 
hands, due to the importance of haptic perception in experiencing the size of apples and grapes 
(Connell, Lynott, & Dreyer, 2012).  The same effect does not occur for non-manipulable object 
like elephant or deer, where size experience and judgements tend to rely on visual information.  
In short, the conceptual system has effectively co-opted the perceptual, motor, and affective 
systems for the purposes of representation (Connell & Lynott, 2014b), and simulated information
is central to much of human conceptual processing.
The importance of simulated information in mental representation, however, does not 
mean that it alone subserves conceptual processing. Linguistic information emerges from our 
experience with language, and represents conceptual knowledge as statistical patterns of how 
words are distributed in relation to one another (Barsalou et al., 2008; Connell & Lynott, 2014b; 
Louwerse, 2011; Lynott & Connell, 2010).  Natural languages are full of statistical regularities: 
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words and phrases tend to occur repeatedly in similar contexts, and sensitivity to such 
regularities provides a powerful generalised learning mechanism from early infancy (Aslin & 
Newport, 2012; Saffran, 2003; Smith & Yu, 2008).  Repeated exposure to language – and a 
typical adult is exposed to approximately 100,000 words per day (Bohn & Short, 2009) – allows 
a complex web of word–to–word (and word–to–phrase, phrase–to–phrase, etc.) associations to 
develop.  A linguistic representation of car, for instance, may include associated words and 
phrases that frequently appear in proximity to the word “car”, such as “sports”, “insurance”, 
“park”, “used”, and “driver”. 
Information from language alone is powerful enough to capture many aspects human 
experience.  Empirical evidence for its utility in conceptual processing has come from a range of 
tasks, including property verification (Louwerse & Connell, 2011), property generation (Santos, 
Chaigneau, Simmons, & Barsalou, 2011; Simmons, Hamann, Harenski, Hu, & Barsalou, 2008), 
conceptual combination (Connell & Lynott, 2013), semantic relatedness and spatial iconicity 
(Louwerse & Hutchinson, 2012; Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010), metaphor comprehension 
(Hutchinson & Louwerse, 2013; Liu, Connell & Lynott, 2018), and SNARC effects (Hutchinson 
& Louwerse, 2014).  For example, the order of word distribution in English is highly directional 
(e.g., “root” tends to be mentioned before “branch” more often than vice versa). Louwerse and 
Jeuniaux (2010) showed that people are influenced by this directional linguistic information 
when making judgements about the spatial location of objects.  When asked whether a “branch” 
typically occurs above a “root”, both speed and accuracy of responses were influenced by 
linguistic information about word order, even when this word order was inconsistent with spatial 
configurations in the real world (i.e., “root”…“branch” is the typical word order, even though 
branch…root is the typical spatial configuration).  Critically, the same effect of word order 
appeared when pictures were used rather than words (e.g., presenting an image of a branch 
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above a root). That is, the role of linguistic distributional information in conceptual processing is 
not confined to language stimuli, but also influences ostensibly non-linguistic tasks with image 
stimuli, and thus has broad importance across human conceptual processing.
In theoretical terms, there is some disagreement as to the extent to which concepts rely 
upon linguistic versus simulated information.  Barsalou et al.'s (2008) Language As Situated 
Simulation (LASS) theory favours simulation as the main driver of conceptual processing; 
linguistic information – however useful it may be – lends itself mainly to a subset of 
circumstances where superficial strategies can adequately support task performance.  By 
contrast, Louwerse's (2011; see also Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008) Symbol Interdependency 
Hypothesis (SIH) accords a dominant role to linguistic rather than simulated information, and 
proposes that, due to the way it encodes perceptual relations in the real world, it is capable of 
doing much of the heavy lifting in a range of cognitive tasks. An alternative possibility lies in 
between these two accounts, namely that neither linguistic nor simulated information is 
fundamentally more important than the other across conceptual processing as a whole, but rather 
that the relative importance of each at a particular point in time in a particular individual depends
on a variety of factors.  As detailed elsewhere (Connell & Lynott, 2014, TopiCS), a conceptual 
representation is in itself a process, whereby distributed neural activation patterns across 
sensorimotor, affective, language, and other areas coordinate to subserve the requirements of the 
moment, and thereby include both simulated and linguistic information. So sensitive is this 
process to factors including concurrent sensorimotor and attentional processing, the availability 
of appropriate labels, and the accumulation and retrieval of sensorimotor and linguistic 
experience over time, that even if one attempts to hold the task requirements constant, an 
individual’s representation of a particular concept (e.g., car) is never precisely the same from one
occasion to the next.  Neither simulated nor linguistic information necessarily dominate such 
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conceptual representations because both are needed to provide sufficient flexibility and 
robustness to a cognitive system that must operate continuously in a noisy environment with 
limited resources.
Is Linguistic Information Grounded?
Although its basic form is the label, linguistic information is not amodal in that it does 
not comprise ungrounded symbols.  When considering the mechanics of grounding, however, it 
is important to distinguish between grounding of concepts in long-term memory and grounding 
of a particular instantiated representation. A concept in long-term memory is an aggregate of 
sensory, motor, affective, situational, and linguistic (i.e., label) experience, that develops by 
repeatedly attending to aspects of experience that have overlapping patterns of neural activation. 
Linguistic information in long-term memory is therefore grounded because labels are attached to 
the sensorimotor-affective-situational experience of their referent.  However, the instantiated 
representation of a concept is a dynamic and transient entity, constructed on the fly according to 
the constraints of task demands, context, available resources, and processing goals, and includes 
perceptual, motor, affective, situational, and linguistic (i.e., label) information to greater or lesser
degrees (Connell & Lynott, 2014b). Linguistic information in a given instance of conceptual 
representation is therefore not necessarily grounded at that particular point in time because the 
specific information that makes up a dynamic mental representation will vary and may include 
little or no simulated information alongside the label.  That is, “the concept to which a word 
refers is ultimately grounded in the simulation system; however, a word does not need to be fully
grounded every time it is processed” (Louwerse & Connell, 2011, p. 393).  This notion of limited
grounding is central to the SIH (Louwerse, 2011; Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008), which argues 
that, because labels link to each other as well as to grounded referents, it is possible for language 
comprehenders to ground only some labels and then 
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distributional patterns between the labels themselves. 
For instance, imagine someone develops their concept of car in long-term memory via a 
wide range of perceptual, motor, and affective experiences of cars across multiple situational 
contexts, and via a wide range of related words in statistical distributions around the label “car” 
across multiple contexts. The long-term concept of car therefore has a rich variety of information
potentially available, and a particular instantiation of car will draw upon a subset of this 
information to create an appropriate representation for the demands and constraints of the 
occasion. Sometimes, a particular instantiation of car may include little perceptual, motor, or 
affective information and may instead rely heavily on linguistic information: for instance, when 
judging rapidly that “car” and “park” are semantically related. Thus, although the concept car is 
indeed fully grounded in terms of the information available in long-term memory, all this 
grounded information is not necessarily represented during a given instance of conceptual 
processing.  
In summary, concepts in long-term memory comprise both linguistic and simulated 
information, and so the labels that make up linguistic information are grounded in the 
sensorimotor-affective-situational experience that makes up simulated information.  Because the 
content of instantiated representations varies to fulfill momentary demands, however, labels are 
not necessarily grounded on every occasion of conceptual processing.
Does Linguistic Information Simply Mirror Simulated Information?
Linguistic distributional statistics and simulated distributional statistics contain similar 
patterns, but do not directly reflect one another.  In contrast to linguistic information, which 
comprises statistical regularities between word forms, simulated information encodes statistical 
regularities at the level of meaning due to the inclusion of situational context in simulated 
representations.  A car, for instance, typically has wheels and a driver, operates on the road or 
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street, and sometimes needs a service or repair.  Objects, events, and other situational entities 
tend to occur together in the real world in ways that, through cumulative interactive experience, 
can give rise to statistical patterns of how referent concepts are distributed in relation to one 
another.
It might seem reasonable to expect language to mirror this real-world distribution of 
referent concepts.  Indeed, both LASS (Barsalou et al., 2008) and SIH (Louwerse, 2011) 
implicitly assume that linguistic distributional statistics largely, if not completely, reflect the 
same information as sensorimotor experience of the real world. However, we do not talk about 
the world merely to describe it, but to question, analyse, interpret, abstract, and predict it.  As 
such, I propose that the statistical distributions of how words co-occur with one another offers a 
rich medium of associative information that goes beyond the statistical distributions of how 
referent concepts co-occur in real-world experience.  Linguistic information can therefore, in 
principle, capture qualitatively different aspects of conceptual representation to that which can be
captured by simulated information.
Take, for instance, the concept of democracy. One learns about democracy by reading, 
hearing, and using its label alongside other words such as “government”, “human rights”, 
“election”, “freedom”, “vote”, and so on.  One also learns about democracy by going to a polling
station and marking a ballot in order to cast a vote.  While these linguistic and sensorimotor 
experiences of democracy are related, they differ in their broader situational contexts.  
Sensorimotor experience (real or vicarious) is limited to physical interactions with concrete 
entities and there is no direct concrete referent of democracy, only of related concepts such as 
polling station, ballot paper, and so on.  Of course, the experience of reading, hearing, and 
speaking about democracy also has a sensorimotor basis, but it is concerned with the visual, 
auditory, and motor experience of word forms, and not with sensorimotor experience of the 
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words’ referents.  Hence, the statistical patterns of how entities and events are distributed in 
sensorimotor experience of democracy will not easily capture its relationship with concepts such 
as freedom or human rights. By contrast, linguistic experience can include both descriptions of 
sensorimotor experience of a label’s referent and metaphysical discussions of the concept itself.  
The experience of the label “democracy” can include contexts where its history is analysed, its 
validity questioned, its effects on society interpreted, and other high-level topics of discussion 
that have no direct sensorimotor correlate.  That said, linguistic experience is limited to situations
that people choose to speak and write about and so cannot perfectly describe all sensorimotor 
experience. The statistical patterns of how words are distributed in linguistic experience of 
democracy therefore cannot easily capture certain aspects of a real-world experience, such as 
those that are relatively unimportant (e.g., the precise colour of the pencil in a polling booth), or 
highly personal or taboo (e.g., an individual’s unspoken aversion to a candidate’s name).
To summarise, linguistic distributional statistics are not a deterministic function of 
sensorimotor distributional statistics, and – although they share mutual information – each 
should be capable of contributing unique information to conceptual processing.  While 
sensorimotor experience can capture a richness and precision of detail that remains unspoken and
therefore eludes linguistic information, the statistical regularities in language have, in principle, 
an ability to inform us about conceptual relations in a way that the statistical regularities in 
sensorimotor-affective experience of the real world cannot. There is some empirical support for 
this position from computational modelling research.  For example, Louwerse and Connell 
(2011) examined whether linguistic distributional information could predict the perceptual 
modality of various sensory adjectives (e.g., rustling, speckled, delicious).  Using co-occurrence 
frequencies from a large corpus to model word distributions, they found that words could be 
successfully classified into auditory, visual-haptic, and olfactory-gustatory clusters with a high 
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degree of accuracy.  However, it was not possible to separate touch-related words like sharp 
from sight-related words like speckled, nor taste-related words like delicious from smell-related 
words like smoky, on the basis of language alone.  Such evidence suggests that the structure of 
linguistic distributional information sometimes approximates that of simulated information but is
less detailed and precise concerning sensorimotor details, meaning that simulated information is 
uniquely responsible for sensorimotor precision (see also Barsalou et al., 2008; Connell & 
Lynott, 2014b; Riordan & Jones, 2011).  On the other hand, Andrews, Vigliocco, & Vinson 
(2009) demonstrated that linguistic information also has the capacity to capture aspects of 
experience that simulated sensorimotor information may not.  They compared the structure of 
distributional statistics derived from corpus analysis (i.e., linguistic information) and feature-
listing norms (i.e., simulated information).  They found that linguistic distributions tended to 
emphasise more encyclopedic information (e.g., taxonomies and abstractions: eat → food, diet, 
eaten, cereals) whereas feature distributions tended to emphasise more sensorimotor information
(e.g., physical acts and interactions: eat → vomit, taste, teeth, drink).  Moreover, the combination
of linguistic and simulated information was better able to predict semantic priming data than 
either type of information alone.  Linguistic distributional information can therefore do more 
than simply – and imperfectly – reflect sensorimotor experience, and appears to be capable of 
capturing a qualitatively different form of information that makes a unique contribution to 
conceptual processing.
While the above evidence supports the general principle, a number of key questions 
remain unanswered regarding the extent to which the statistical regularities in language go 
beyond a mere reflection of the statistical regularities in sensorimotor-affective experience of the 
real world.  For example, what proportion of information in linguistic distributional statistics is 
unique? And is this unique information systematically restricted to certain types of concepts or 
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randomly distributed throughout the conceptual system?  Several theories of conceptual 
representation now assume that abstract concepts are acquired via language, and are represented 
via linguistic information, to a greater extent than are concrete concepts (Borghi & Binkofski, 
2014; Crutch & Warrington, 2005; Vigliocco et al., 2009). Linguistic information might be 
relatively more important to an abstract concept like democracy, for example, compared to a 
concrete concept like chair. Moreover, it appears that many, if not most, of our concepts might 
be abstract rather than concrete; in Brysbaert, Warriner, and Kuperman’s (2014) concreteness 
norms for words that are known by at least 85% of English speakers, some 53% of 40,000 words 
fell in the abstract end of the scale. It is therefore possible that any unique information from 
linguistic distributional statistics is likely to be present to a greater extent in abstract than in 
concrete concepts, and – given the large number of abstract concepts in our conceptual system – 
that the proportion of unique information is far from negligible.
What Advantage has Linguistic Information?
One critical difference between processing simulated versus linguistic information is that 
linguistic association is typically faster than simulation (Barsalou et al., 2008; Connell & Lynott, 
2014b; Lynott & Connell, 2010). When a word is presented, activation of linguistic associates 
reaches peak activation before relatively slower simulated information is fully available (see 
LASS theory: Barsalou et al., 2008).  This speed advantage is a general tendency rather than an 
absolute difference, and may vary with the demands and constraints of the wider situation.  
Nonetheless, supporting evidence has been found in a range of paradigms, including behavioral 
(Connell & Lynott, 2013; Louwerse & Connell, 2011; Santos et al., 2011), electrophysiological 
(Louwerse & Hutchinson, 2012), and neuroimaging (Simmons et al., 2008) studies.  For 
instance, when asked to list properties for a given concept, Santos et al. (2011) found that people 
tended to begin by listing linguistic associates of the word (e.g., bee → hive, honey, sting) and 
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later moved onto non-associates that were consistent with simulating the concept in a broad 
situational context (bee → wings, summer, flowers).  Moreover, neural activation while listing 
the early properties overlapped with individually-established activations for word association 
(Broca’s area in the left inferior frontal gyrus), and activation while listing the late properties 
overlapped with activations for deliberately imagining a situation (right posterior superior 
temporal sulcus: Simmons et al., 2008).
However, the speed advantage of linguistic association does not mean that sensorimotor-
affective simulation is slow.  Simulated information is activated extremely rapidly.  In word 
reading, for instance, action words relating to the leg versus face produce topographic differences
in neurophysiological activation approximately 200 ms after word onset (Hauk & PulvermLller, 
2004), suggesting very rapid access to effector-specific motor simulations.  Nonetheless, 
sensitivity to linguistic distributional information also occurs very early. Contexts that frequently
versus infrequently co-occur with a target word elicit greater negativity in distributed/frontal 
regions approximately 120 ms after target word onset, even when both contexts are semantically 
related to the target with similar cloze probability (Molinaro, Barraza, & Carreiras, 2013), which 
suggests very rapid access to common linguistic associates.  
It is essential, however, not to conflate early neural activation with conceptual activation 
at task completion.  The crux of the linguistic speed advantage has more to do with the relative 
activation of conceptual information that can inform a response (i.e., at what point in the 
timecourse of a given task does the word “car” activate critically useful information?), than with 
literal neurophysiological activation (i.e., at what point can the word “car” produce a differential 
activation trace in EEG/MEG?). Indeed, because the systems of linguistic and simulated 
information interact and reinforce one another in cycles of activation during conceptual 
processing (i.e., linguistic information can activate simulated information, which in turn can 
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activate further linguistic information, and so on: Barsalou et al., 2008; Connell & Lynott, 
2014b), early neural activation in one system may lead to a response that is primarily driven by 
the other system.  That is, there is a disconnect between the question of whether linguistic or 
simulation areas first show measurable neurophysiological activation, and the question of 
whether the conceptual activation that drives a particular response is primarily linguistic or 
simulated in nature.  For example, take a semantic priming task where the prime word is “car” 
and the target word is “driver”.  The word “driver” can be conceptually activated in two ways: 
via linguistic association from the prime “car”, or via labelling the sensorimotor-affective 
simulation of car with a driver behind the steering wheel. When “car” primes “driver”, which 
form of conceptual activation is responsible?  At this point, it does not particularly matter 
whether the sensorimotor cortex or linguistic association areas were activated first on 
presentation of the word “car”.  Rather, what matters is the relative activation of linguistic and 
simulated information at the point that a response is required.  In our example, linguistic 
association from “car” → “driver” will typically be faster than simulating a situation and then 
labelling it, as in “car” → car with a driver behind the steering wheel → “driver”, and so 
linguistic information will primarily drive the response to the target word “driver”.  Other 
responses may be primarily driven by simulated information if the target word is not a close 
linguistic associate of the prime, but the critical point remains.  When it comes to conceptual 
activation, linguistic association is typically faster than simulation. 
The Linguistic Shortcut Hypothesis
To recap, concept labels do not have to be grounded every time they are processed, the 
distributional patterns of labels have the capacity to capture unique conceptual information as 
well as approximate sensorimotor experience, and label-to-label association operates faster than 
simulation.  Together, these characteristics mean that linguistic associates can be viewed as 
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computationally cheaper than simulation – faster, less effortful, but still information-rich – which
enables an heuristic mechanism in conceptual processing termed the linguistic shortcut (Connell 
& Lynott, 2013, 2014b; Lynott & Connell, 2010).  If computationally cheaper information from 
linguistic associates can usefully inform a response in a particular task before relatively more 
expensive simulated information can do so, then linguistic information effectively has the 
potential to act as a shortcut during conceptual processing. The main impact of this linguistic 
shortcut is that associative information between concept labels can sometimes provide adequate 
conceptual representation without the need to develop a detailed simulation.  In other words, a 
label can, at times, act in place of sensorimotor simulation of its referent meaning.
In the above example of processing the word “car”, activating the label “driver” via 
linguistic association is not necessarily any use to the particular task at hand; whether processing 
can stop here, or whether further processing must (and can) be pursued in the simulation and/or 
linguistic system, varies according to circumstance.  Conceptual processing does not happen in a 
vacuum but usually occurs with the goal of making a response, whether it’s a specific response in
an experimental paradigm (e.g., “Peach can be fuzzy?”: press “yes” or “no” button), a spoken 
responses in real-world dialogue (e.g., “What's in a Bellini?” → “Prosecco and peach juice”, or 
“I don't know”), an action response to environmental stimuli (e.g., “Are there any peaches left?” 
→ find a peach in a fruit bowl full of apples, apricots, and nectarines), or simply a mental 
response in an ongoing train of thought (e.g., What do you call that fruit that’s like a peach but 
not fuzzy? → “nectarine”).  When and where the linguistic shortcut is likely to be used to inform 
a response in a conceptual task depends on many factors, including depth of processing demands,
the resources available for processing, and motivation of the individual.  The rest of this section 
reviews the evidence for several such circumstances.
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Depth of Processing Demands
The linguistic shortcut becomes particularly useful when a task allows relatively shallow 
or superficial conceptual processing.  Shallow processing in this sense means that each word (in 
a sentence, paragraph, or other task) does not contribute its full potential meaning and/or is 
integrated incompletely into the broader context, resulting in an underspecified representation 
(Sanford & Sturt, 2002). That is, not every task requires a wholly accurate and fully developed 
conceptual representation, and sometimes a fuzzy, “good enough” approximation will suffice 
(Ferreira, Bailey & Ferraro, 2002). Deep processing, on the other hand, means each word 
contributes a full and detailed meaning and is integrated completely into the broader context, 
resulting in a fully-specified representation.  The difference between shallow and deep 
processing is relative and perhaps best illustrated with an example.  When asked to answer the 
question “When an aircraft crashes, where should the survivors be buried?”, only 20% of 
participants noticed the anomaly that survivors are living people whom one does not bury 
(Barton & Sanford, 1993).  That is, most people have processed the word “survivors” only 
shallowly because it fits the situation described in the rest of the sentence and does not jump out 
as meriting closer attention.  When the question asked about a bicycle accident instead of an air 
crash, detection rates rose to 80% because the word “survivors” does not fit and led most people 
to process its meaning more deeply.
The representation of word meaning for a given individual in a given context depends on 
what particular information makes up the dynamic mental representation at hand, and so long as 
an ongoing representation can appropriately fulfil current task goals, it is fit for purpose (Connell
& Lynott, 2014b).  Both the LASS theory (Barsalou et al., 2008) and SIH (Louwerse & Jeuniaux,
2008; see also Connell & Louwerse, 2011) hold that linguistic information is well suited to 
shallow conceptual processing where a “good enough” approximation will suffice, whereas 
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simulated information is required for deeper conceptual processing where precise detail and/or 
integration into the broader situation is necessary.  One would therefore expect that, unless a task
requires deep and precise conceptual processing, a concept might be represented and processed 
via its label and associated linguistic information rather than via a detailed simulation of its 
referent.  In support, Solomon and Barsalou (2004) found that people tended to rely on linguistic 
association in a property verification task (e.g., true or false: salmon→scales) when the false 
filler items were unassociated (e.g., bicycle→chin), because the conflation of true/false with 
associated/unassociated allowed a shallow association strategy to suffice.  Only when difficult 
associated false fillers were included (e.g., banana→monkey) did people begin to process the 
concepts more deeply, and linguistic association could no longer predict responses.
Connell and Lynott (2013) took the depth of processing proposal one step further by 
examining the same stimuli in two related tasks: shallow sensibility judgement of novel noun-
noun phrases (e.g., yes or no: does elephant complaint make sense?”) and deep interpretation 
generation (e.g., yes or no: can you think of a meaning for elephant complaint?).  Critically, 
although the stimuli were all novel, the constituent nouns varied in their distributional co-
occurrence frequencies.  They found that linguistic distributional information predicted the speed
of accepting a phrase as sensible but not accepting a phrase as interpretable.  That is, sensibility 
judgement could get away with using the linguistic shortcut as an heuristic: the more often the 
constituent words appeared together in language, the more quickly people accepted the phrase as 
making sense.  In contrast, interpretation generation – that is, actually coming up with a meaning
– needed deeper processing that linguistic information could not offer, and presumably relied on 
simulated information to generate a meaning (see also Liu et al., 2018).
Word meaning can potentially be represented anywhere on the continuum between 
extremely shallow linguistic association and extremely deep sensorimotor-affective-situational 
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simulation, and any point on this continuum is as valid a form of meaning as any other if it 
allows someone to read a novel, communicate in dialogue, press buttons in an experiment, or 
whatever the response goal might be.  By exploiting the distributional information in label-to-
label associations, the linguistic shortcut offers a quick heuristic that may be good enough to 
inform a response without requiring deeper processing.  Where possible, when a shallow 
response will suffice, a label may act in place of a detailed simulation of its referent.  
Available Processing Resources
The linguistic shortcut is also useful when a task begins to strain available cognitive 
resources.  While simulating sensorimotor experience of a familiar concept such as car or 
banana might be relatively straightforward, it comprises only a small part of conceptual 
processing.  People must also be able to represent new concepts, process familiar concepts in 
new ways, and do so within the constraint that such conceptual processing might not always be 
successful.  Humans do not have infinite executive and memory resources to devote to 
conceptual processing, and so it would greatly enhance cognitive efficiency if there were some 
form of triage mechanism available that could flag up at an early stage when a particular 
conceptual process is likely to prove excessively difficult and is not worth further effort.
Connell and Lynott (2013; Lynott & Connell, 2010) propose that the linguistic shortcut 
can offer such a cognitive triage mechanism.  Since concepts that are often discussed in the same
context are likely to be easily integrated in a shared situation (Lynott & Connell, 2010), linguistic
distributional information from concept labels offers a guide to the likelihood of successful 
simulation.  Moreover, since linguistic information is available quickly and computationally 
cheaply, it can provide a “quick and dirty” heuristic to determine whether it is worth expending 
precious cognitive effort on a particular conceptual processing task, or whether such processing 
should be abandoned pending further clarification or information.   That is, conceptual 
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processing can be halted at the point of representing concepts via their labels and associated 
linguistic information rather than continuing to develop a detailed simulation that may fail to 
cohere or otherwise incur unnecessary costs.
The idea of the linguistic shortcut acting as a cognitive triage mechanism has empirical 
support.  As previously discussed, Connell and Lynott (2013) asked people to either judge the 
sensibility or provide an interpretation of novel noun-noun compounds (e.g., elephant 
complaint): a conceptual combination task that required creating a new representation. However, 
Connell and Lynott did not only examine “yes” responses that represented successful conceptual 
processing (i.e., responses where the compounds were judged as sensible or an interpretation was
provided), but also “no” responses that would traditionally be discarded as representing 
unsuccessful processing of the task (i.e., responses where compounds were deemed to make no 
sense or have no meaningful interpretation).  They found that people were more likely to reject a 
novel conceptual combination as nonsensical or uninterpretable, and do so more rapidly, when 
the constituent words rarely co-occurred across language. That is, linguistic distributional 
information predicted both the likelihood and speed of abandoning conceptual processing; 
exactly as expected from a cognitive triage mechanism.  
Liu et al. (2018) explored the mechanism in more detail by introducing a competing 
measure of ease of simulation (i.e., a normed variable that reflects how easily a phrase could 
result in a coherent simulation of meaning) and comparing its effect to that of distributional co-
occurrence frequency in metaphor processing. Following Connell and Lynott (2013), Liu et al. 
found that people were more likely to reject a sentence as nonsensical when the constituent 
words seldom co-occurred across language (e.g., illness can be bright) compared to when they 
co-occurred more often (e.g., supply can be bright), and additionally showed that this effect 
occurred independently of ease of simulation.  The speed of rejection, however, was more 
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complex.  People quickly rejected metaphors that were typically considered to be difficult to 
simulate, but this effect was moderated by co-occurrence frequency. When the words in a 
metaphor rarely co-occurred, ease of simulation had a reduced effect, suggesting that people 
rejected metaphors as nonsensical based on their low co-occurrence frequency without further 
processing of simulated information.  In other words, the linguistic shortcut was used as a 
cognitive triage mechanism to identify processing that was unlikely to result in a coherent 
simulation and should therefore be halted rather than potentially waste resources on unnecessary 
processing.
Because there is an inherent tension between the needs of conceptual processing to 
represent new concepts or word meanings and the limited cognitive resources that are available 
to do so, a system of cognitive triage can help manage the strain on resources by allowing 
processing to be abandoned, postponed, or prioritised according to the requirements of the 
moment.  The linguistic shortcut offers one such cognitive triage mechanism by using the 
distributional information in label-to-label associations as a quick heuristic to flag up when a 
particular occasion of conceptual processing is likely to lead to unnecessary costs.  That is, a 
label may act in place of of a detailed simulation of its referent when it offers the possibility to 
optimize or satisfice conceptual processing in a limited-resource cognitive system.
Conclusions
So apart from the approximation of sensorimotor information, the contribution of unique 
information, optional grounding, enhanced speed, a computationally cheap linguistic shortcut, a 
means of “good enough” processing, and a cognitive triage mechanism, what have labels ever 
done for us?  As future research will most likely demonstrate, quite a bit.  We are only at the 
beginning of establishing exactly how, where, and when conceptual processing relies on labels 
and their associations.  A wide variety of evidence underscores the important role that linguistic 
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information plays in cognition and conceptual processing, but there remain several outstanding 
questions about the circumstances that affect the relative roles of linguistic versus simulated 
information.  For instance, the content of mental representations dynamically changes with 
available resources, current goals, and individual motivations.  Does reliance on computationally
cheap linguistic information therefore increase when available resources are restricted, such as 
when participants must respond under time pressure, carry out a concurrent cognitive task, or 
retain a load in memory?  Or when participant motivation is low, such as when people are 
unconcerned about performing the task accurately due to fatigue, boredom, or lack of reward?  
More research is needed to address these issues in order to pin down a proper understanding of 
how linguistic labels enable fault tolerance in conceptual processing, and allow cognition to 
respond dynamically and flexibly to varying demands and constraints.
The Linguistic Shortcut Hypothesis shares many commonalities with Barsalou and 
colleagues' (2008) LASS theory and Louwerse's (2011) SIH, but there are three critical 
differences.  Firstly, while LASS favours simulation as the main driver of conceptual processing 
and SIH favours linguistic information, the Linguistic Shortcut Hypothesis proposes a middle 
ground: neither linguistic nor simulated information is fundamentally more important than the 
other across conceptual processing as a whole, and their relative importance in a given response 
depends on a variety of factors.  Secondly, both LASS and SIH assume that linguistic 
distributional statistics reflect (albeit imperfectly) the same information as sensorimotor 
experience of the real world, whereas I propose that linguistic information captures unique 
conceptual information and enables some conceptual processing that would not be possible with 
sensorimotor simulation alone.  Both of these differences have been discussed earlier in the 
paper.  There is, however, a third difference. LASS and SIH both describe how linguistic 
information can help conceptual processing reach a successful outcome: a response that fulfils 
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the requirements of the task.  That is, conceptual processing can proceed via slow-but-accurate 
simulation or fast-but-approximate linguistic information; sometimes linguistic information will 
suffice, but where it does not, conceptual processing can fall back on a detailed sensorimotor 
simulation.  However, the Linguistic Shortcut Hypothesis goes further by proposing that 
linguistic information has a broader role that facilitates not only the successful outcome of 
conceptual processing (i.e., a response that fulfils task requirements) but also the unsuccessful 
outcome (i.e., a response that does not fulfil task requirements), and – critically – helps to 
determine which outcome should be pursued.   While it may seem obvious that a successful 
outcome is desirable from the perspective of the task at hand, an unsuccessful outcome is also 
potentially desirable from the perspective of conserving costs in a cognitive system that has 
limited time and resources to devote to any particular task. 
The cognitive triage mechanism of the Linguistic Shortcut Hypothesis uses linguistic 
information to guide which outcome should be pursued and how much effort should be spent in 
doing do.  Sometimes linguistic information will suggest task requirements cannot be reasonably
met, in which case conceptual processing can quickly and actively opt for an unsuccessful 
outcome and abandon simulation without expending further effort.  Sometimes linguistic 
information is not particularly indicative of whether or not task requirements can be met, and so 
conceptual processing will continue to expend time and effort on simulation in pursuit of an 
uncertain outcome (i.e., a successful or unsuccessful outcome will depend on whether a detailed 
sensorimotor simulation can meet task requirements).  Finally, sometimes linguistic information 
will suggest task requirements should be easily met, in which case conceptual processing will 
pursue a successful outcome as outlined by LASS and SIH: sometimes linguistic information 
will suffice, but where it does not, a detailed sensorimotor simulation can be used as a fallback 
option.  To give the distinction an empirical focus, SIH and LASS can predict the latency of 
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conceptual processing that ultimately “works” and fulfils the requirements of the given task (e.g.,
listing object features, Santos et al., 2011; verifying object properties: Louwerse & Connell, 
2011; judging that a novel phrase makes sense: Connell & Lynott, 2013).  The Linguistic 
Shortcut hypothesis can do that and can additionally predict the latency of conceptual processing
that ultimately stalls or fails to meet the requirements of the task (e.g., deciding that one cannot 
think of a meaning for a novel phrase: Connell & Lynott, 2013; deciding a metaphor does not 
make sense: Liu et al., 2018).  Failure to fulfil the requirements of a particular task is not 
necessarily an error, or the unfortunate result of conceptual processing gone wrong, but is 
sometimes a sensible and systematic option to conserve effort in a cognitive system of limited 
resources. Further research should explore the timecourse of unsuccessful conceptual processing 
as a means of establishing how linguistic versus simulated information contribute to cognitive 
efficiency.
Whorf (1956, p. 212) contended that “Language is not merely a reproducing instrument 
for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the 
individual's mental activity”.  While the first part may be true – language is far more than a 
vehicle for meaning – the second part of Whorf’s contention is too restrictive.  Language is not a 
shaping program for perception, action, and other aspects of cognition; such a program would be
unnecessarily narrow and imprison cognitive function in the labels and structure of language.  
Rather, linguistic labels are an essential springboard in the framework of human cognition that 
enables concepts to be represented and manipulated with more flexibility and efficiency than 
would otherwise be possible.
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